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Abstract In this paper, we examine the use of the term
‘life’ in the debates within and about synthetic biology.
We review different positions within these debates, fo-
cusing on the historical background, the constructive
epistemology of laboratory research and the pros and
cons of metaphorical speech. We argue that ‘life’ is used
as buzzword, as folk concept, and as theoretical concept
in inhomogeneous ways. Extending beyond the review of
the significant literature, we also argue that ‘life’ can be
understood as aBurstword in two concrete senses. Firstly,
terms such as life easily turn into fuzzy, foggy and buzzy
clouds of nonsense, if their use is not appropriately
reflected. In these cases, the semantic orientation is deto-
nated. This is theBurstword I characteristic of the concept
of ‘life’ that we reveal for its unclear terminological use.
Secondly, and in contrast to Burstword I, we show that
the concept of ‘life’ can be used in a methodologically
controlled way. We call this kind of use Burstword II.
Here the concept of ‘life’ fulfils the function of expanding
an inadequately narrow disciplinary or conceptual focus
in different discursive contexts. In this second sense, ‘life’
receives an important operational function, for instance as
a transdisciplinary research principle. It turns out that the
innovative function and paradigm-changing power of
metaphorical speech belong here as well. Finally, we
illustrate three ethically relevant examples that show
how ‘life’ can be applied as Burstword II in the context
of synthetic biology.
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From Review to Reaction: Introduction
As a subdiscipline of biology (the natural science of
life), synthetic biology engages by definition with ‘life’
and its metaphors. What makes it special and new is its
constructive, engineering approach. It can be said that
the groundbreaking aim of synthetic biology is, as Ruiz-
Mirazo and Moreno put it, ‘to learn more about the
living by means of re-construction or fabricating it—in
contrast to the analytical-descriptive work that has, so
far, been the most important way of generation knowl-
edge in biology’ ([97], p. 378). It is exactly this
combination—the engineering attitude and certain life
forms as its objects—that raises a lot of questions and
especially engenders ethical criticism. The special ethi-
cal relevance of synthetic biology is supposed to be
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explained by the conviction that synthetic biology ‘en-
tails a confrontation with life’ (ibid.). In a broader con-
text, both conceptual and ethical questions of synthetic
biology generally call for philosophical investigations
into the relations in which the words ‘technology’ and
‘life’ are used ([58], pp. 117–118). In order to contribute
to this challenge, wewill reframe how the concept of life
is used in the debates within and about synthetic biolo-
gy. This paper combines a review of the current discus-
sion with a critical reaction to these debates by suggest-
ing another perspective that has received little attention
so far: With our guiding thought, from buzz to burst, we
literally advance from review to reaction. Our summary
of some of the most important understandings of ‘life’ is
thus a prerequisite for structuring the debate in a new
systematic and narrative way.
The systematic contribution can be found in the
attempt to combine a problematisation based on selected
(but far from all) aspects of the historical background
with positions in the debate about ‘life’ today. Another
focus is metaphorical speech, such as the ‘genetic code’
metaphor as a metaphor of life, or ‘living machines’,
where the term ‘life’ itself is part of the metaphorical
construction. Our account considers two characteristic
poles in the debate that emphasise both the massive
critique and the positive functions of metaphorical
speech for research processes. Different connotations
are related to ‘life’ as buzzword or as folk or theoretical
concept. Additionally, we introduce the idea that ‘life’
can be used as Burstword in two concrete ways: firstly,
with a negative connotation, when it comes with the
unproductive detonation of semantic orientation, due to
unclear fuzzy, foggy and buzzy speech (Burstword I).
The more a concept is used as a buzzword for external
purposes, the more it might burst the semantic precision
required for successful scientific communication—an
observation that is by nomeans limited to the term ‘life’.
Secondly, it is used to broaden in methodologically
controlled operations the conceptual and/or disciplinary
foci wherever they are not appropriate to the intended
object or problem (Burstword II). For instance, the
paradigm-changing power of metaphors belongs to this
side of the coin. Of course we are aware of the fact that a
Burstword (I or II) can be seen as a metaphor itself—
with all the pros and cons of metaphorical speech. Due
to its epistemic function, therefore, our primary focus is
on the Burstword II characteristic of ‘life’, which can
also be seen as a metaphor for the cognitive and inno-
vative power of metaphors. In order to make this idea
more precise, we present three concrete, ethically rele-
vant examples.
Our account is divided into five main steps (‘Life Is
Not Life: Aristotle’s Wide Concept of Life and the
Current Condensation of Modern Thinking in Synthetic
Biology’, ‘From Buzz to Fuzz: the Dangers of the
Unclear and Metaphorical Use of ‘Life’’, ‘From Buzz
to Boost: Naturalisation of Life and Its Methodological
Reduction in Synthetic Biology’, ‘From Radiation to
Rehabilitation: the Positive Methodological Functions
of Metaphors of Life and Life as Metaphor’, ‘From
Buzz to False Alarm: Fallacies Regarding the Norma-
tive Effects of a Fabrication of ‘Life’’) including two
subsections each. ‘Life Is Not Life: Aristotle’s Wide
Concept of Life and the Current Condensation of Mod-
ern Thinking in Synthetic Biology’ provides an initial
understanding of ‘life’ by recapitulating the wide Aris-
totelian understanding, in contrast to its current narrow
use in fields like synthetic biology or astrobiology
(‘From Holism to Reduction and Far Beyond: Wide
and NarrowUnderstandings of Life’).We also introduce
the relationship between nature and culture as a second
field of controversy, which refers to another historical
root of discourses about life: the seventeenth-century
mechanisation of ‘life’, which is highly significant for
the debates about ‘life’ today (‘From Opposition to
Amalgamation: Natural and Cultural Life’). ‘From Buzz
to Fuzz: the Dangers of the Unclear and Metaphorical
Use of ‘Life’’ turns to the characterisation of the uses of
the concept of life as Burstword I and critically exam-
ines positions which we consider to be the dark side of
these debates. Here ‘life’ is seen as a buzzword for
funding acquisition or as a folk concept without any
significance for scientific reasoning at all (‘No Need to
Argue, No Need for Definitions’). An important role is
played by technomorphic metaphors with an engineer-
ing or information technological (IT) background.
Whenever ‘life’ is addressed in metaphorical speech or
becomes part of technomorphic metaphors like ‘living
machines’ or ‘genetic information’, risks of ideological
misuse or mystification stand in the focus of the critique
(‘What Is the Meta for? Risks of Technomorphic Meta-
phors in Uncertain Situations’). ‘From Buzz to Boost:
Naturalisation of Life and Its Methodological Reduction
in Synthetic Biology’ reconstructs the epistemology of
synthetic biology in order to reveal the methodological-
ly controlled and positive aspect of the concept of life
(Burstword II). Here also, the theoretical interest in
understanding ‘life’ as such, at least in its naturalised
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reduction, plays an important role (‘Life as Theoretical
Object of Synthetic Biology’). Of high significance is
the constructive engineering approach, including con-
cepts like standardisation and modularisation. In this
context, we summarise some of its trademarks and the
new understanding of evolution in innovation-driven
‘fabrications of life’ (‘Engineering Under an Umbrella:
Epistemology of Synthetic Biology and the Construc-
tive Approach’). ‘From Radiation to Rehabilitation: the
PositiveMethodological Functions ofMetaphors of Life
and Life as Metaphor’ turns to the innovative function-
ality of metaphors, for instance in the context of para-
digm changes. Metaphors contain a cognitive function
and can serve as non-propositional truth criteria. Such a
productive use of metaphors presupposes methodologi-
cal control and an awareness of the status of metaphors:
metaphors have to be treated as metaphors. In doing
this, we aim to gain an understanding of what ‘life’ as
Burstword II could mean (‘Reveal the Revolution:
Methodologically Controlled use of Metaphors as
Metaphors’).
In ‘Reveal a Scriptorium 4.0: Linguistic and Biolog-
ical Innovations of the ‘Genetic Code’ Metaphor’,
‘From Buzz to False Alarm: Fallacies Regarding the
Normative Effects of a Fabrication of ‘Life’’, ‘From
Misguiding Simplification to Respectful Complexity:
an Argument Regarding the Ethical Focus’ and ‘From
(Proto)Type to Hype: an Argument for and Against the
Pedagogical Side Effect of ‘LivingMachines’’, we pres-
ent three examples that should demonstrate in detail
what we mean by using life as Burstword II. The first
example remains on the level of metaphorical speech.
We summarise the success story of the ‘genetic code’
metaphor and turn IT-traversed metaphors of life (e.g.
‘genetic information’) upside down: here not only is
‘life’ represented in IT-related terminology, but also
‘information’ in ‘life’-related words. It is at this point
where ‘life’ as Burstword II has power with its wide
me an i n g— e . g . i n c l u d i n g s o c i a l way s o f
life/behaviour—to expand the narrow, naturalised focus
of ITwherever its link to the praxis/way of life of human
communication has been lost (‘Reveal a Scriptorium
4.0: Linguistic and Biological Innovations of the ‘Ge-
netic Code’ Metaphor’) Two more genuine ethical ex-
amples are presented in the sixth step. The second
example involves an argument regarding how ‘life’ as
Burstword II might broaden the ethical focus and avoid
a misleading ethical fundamentalism or even ethical
pseudo-problems (‘From Misguiding Simplification to
Respectful Complexity: an Argument Regarding the
Ethical Focus’). The third example is about the relation
between ‘life’ and ‘machine’. Here it is argued that a
side effect of pedagogical self-conception can be
rejected, in which the treatment of synthetic microor-
ganisms as machines is interpreted as a prototype of the
diminution of the moral respect for higher life forms
such as mammals. Instead, there are good reasons to
expand the understanding of ‘machine’ and apply it to
the products of synthetic biology. In this example, in a
somehow dialectical relation, the limitation of the mean-
ing of ‘life’ in a methodologically controlled way liter-
ally causes a semantic undertow effect and expands the
conceptual range of what a ‘machine’ actually is. If one
is looking for another figurative and maybe experimen-
tal description: here we find an example of an indirect
backdoor bursting II (‘From (Proto)Type to Hype: an
Argument for and Against the Pedagogical Side Effect
of ‘Living Machines’’). These examples will receive a
more detailed explanation in the related sections. They
are intended to serve as suggestions for thinking out of
the box, when the use of ‘life’ in synthetic biology is
critically reflected upon. We are aware that more exam-
ples could be mentioned and developed. We see our
examination as a first approach to language-critical phil-
osophical reflections on synthetic biology and its key
concepts. Such a perspective remains an ongoing chal-
lenge since it depends heavily on the interdisciplinary
dynamics in the field.
Life Is Not Life: Aristotle’s Wide Concept of Life
and the Current Condensation of Modern Thinking
in Synthetic Biology
This section provides an initial understanding of the
term ‘life’ by introducing one of the most influential
conceptualisations in the history of philosophy and sci-
ences, developed by Aristotle. His definition will be
linked to current debates in synthetic biology by focus-
ing on two philosophical problems: (1) the narrow ver-
sus the wide understanding of the term ‘life’ and (2) the
relationship between natural life and cultural life. Both
issues find their ethical meeting point in the differentia-
tion between matter of fact (empirical-descriptive
talking about life) and ‘matter of ought’ (normative-
reflexive talking about life). Basic philosophical and
ethical fields of conflict around the use of the term ‘life’
in synthetic biology are already inherent in Aristotle’s
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concept. He was influenced by Plato, who provided the
first conceptualisation of what we define as life in
the Euro-American context ([60], pp. 53–54). The chal-
lenges to pre-modern ontological and metaphysical con-
cepts of life referred, however, to Aristotle, whose ideas
influenced materialistic and idealistic approaches as
well as ideas of self-organisation, teleology and under-
standing the soul as power that establishes structure
([117], p. 475). Aristotle is one of the most important
reference points of philosophical debates about life
([109], p. 99).
From Holism to Reduction and Far Beyond: Wide
and Narrow Understandings of Life
What we call ‘life’ nowadays has been emphasised by
Aristotle—and other ancient Greek philosophers—in
terms of bios, zôê and psyche ([60], pp. 52–53; [109],
p. 98). The term bios is associated with not only conduct
and way of life but also time and duration of life—
always related to a certain species. Thereby, lifelong
duties and political functions are significant for human
bios ([6, 95], pp. 254–297, Pol VII 1, 1323a-VII, 17,
1337a), whereas zôê describes primary qualities of
plants and animals. In contrast to artificial bodies, lived
bodies are interpreted as a subcategory of natural bodies,
which are characterised by innate causes for processes
of movement, nutrition, growth and decay [4]. Follow-
ing Aristotle, the reason and principle of lived bodies is
termed psychê and thus situated inside the organic cor-
pus ([31], p. 505). Combining a causal and formal
definition, psychê is explained as secondary substance
(ousia): as an essential form (eidos, morphê), which
causes the realisation and fruition (energeia) of a con-
crete lived body, and as an innate skill of organic per-
fection (entelecheia). The principle of lived bodies
thereby follows an incorporated aim (telos). Psychê
summarises several parts of the soul (vegetative, sensi-
tive and rational). Some parts are separated from the
body, such as thinking, while others find their place of
authority (archê) within concrete organs (ibid. pp. 510–
512; [7], pp. 66–87, De Anima II 1, 412a-II 3, 415a). In
contrast to Plato’s metaphysical definition, Aristotle
introduces a philosophy of nature and a biological un-
derstanding of life, including an ethical dimension of
ways of life ([117], p. 475). What life actually means
depends heavi ly on the sociocul tura l se l f -
conceptualisation of humanity. Therefore, a reductionist
biological treatment of ‘life’ always remains incomplete
in comparison to the wider notion of life ([109], p. 97).
Bios, in the sense of the human political and moral
way of life, belongs to a somehow holistic understand-
ing of life—also including cultural life. This wide def-
inition of life, as it has prominently been introduced by
Aristotle and further developed by philosophers until
today, stands in contrast to the more (for methodological
reasons) reductionist treatment of ‘life’ within today’s
biological research—including synthetic biology. Here
the term ‘organism’ has been replaced by ‘living sys-
tems’ that can be defined with respect to their evolution-
ary origin, the cell as basic element, as well as processes
of metabolism, self-reproduction, and mutagenicity. Ad-
ditional aspects depend on the concrete living system
and in the case of humans also include normative char-
acteristics ([117], p. 474). ‘Life’ as it is used in biology
is one of the most complex terms within the field. All
diverse kinds of biological knowing from several disci-
plinary contexts find their meeting point within this
concept ([109], p. 97). Therefore, it includes more than
just an enumeration of the characteristic features of
recent forms of life. It is supposed to be understood with
respect to the geological and phylogenetic perspective
from a general natural-scientific point of view ([79], pp.
33–34).
With a growing interest in artificial life and astrobi-
ology, the controversy over (narrow) definitions of life
that are not limited to organic materiality or a terrestrial
habitat has also heightened [36]. Due to the growing
number of related disciplines, especially in current as-
trobiology, the complexity of the term ‘life’ has in-
creased. It has been objected that an astrobiological
definition of life on the basis of properties is not useful.
Instead, different functions—including a transdisciplin-
ary and diagnostic purpose—can be attributed to the
concept of life [74]. The crucial point here seems to be
that an astrobiological definition of life needs to be
flexible enough to capture totally unexpected new forms
of life ([79], pp. 34–36). Artificial life describes the
computer-oriented modelling of processes of life
([117], p. 474), including the creation of robots ([27],
pp. 132–154). In contrast to this, in synthetic biology,
the characteristic aim is to design living systems that
cannot be found in nature—by using organic materials
([117], p. 474; [27], pp. 155–164).
From a current point of view, the manifold definition
of Aristotle illustrates the ancient roots of the umbrella
status of the term ‘life’ in twenty-first century
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philosophy and indicates the need for non-reductionist
ethical reflections about successful lifestyles in human
societies. Today, the philosophy of human life aims to
complement the biological understanding of life through
specific human categories like communicative life(-
styles) and emotional life—a non-empirical approach
to human forms of ‘good’ and ‘reasonable’ life ([117],
pp. 475–476; [109], pp. 97–98). Since Aristotle’s works
have been received, the word ‘life’ is seen as homony-
mous and useful for integrative purposes as well. It
serves as an umbrella concept and cannot be reduced
to a scientific meaning only ([47], p. 267; [50], p.
255; [61]; [62], p. 4; [107], p. 278; [111], pp. 83–85).
Life in the wide sense is more than a lived organism or
organic system in a certain environment. What does this
mean for the many ways in which the word ‘life’ is used
by natural scientists, engineers, philosophers or the pub-
lic? What are ethical challenges of a peculiar narrow
understanding of life in synthetic biology?
In this paper, we want to argue that the difference
between a wide and holistic understanding of life on
the one side and a narrow and reductionist one on
the other is not only a matter of definition. It also
involves methodological aspects that (could and
should) influence current research in synthetic
biology—especially when it comes to its social im-
plications. We therefore differentiate between two
meanings of life as Burstword (I and II). As we will
see in ‘From Buzz to Fuzz: the Dangers of the
Unclear and Metaphorical Use of ‘Life’’, the term
‘life’ today is used as buzzword, fuzzy or folk con-
cept and metaphor. It might obscure, blur or ideo-
logically misuse the linguistic order of precise sci-
entific terminology in negative ways. Burstword I in
this critical sense means that life can be used in
ways that blow up communication and useful lin-
guistic expressions. There is a concrete risk—and
even the expected or unexpected danger—that ‘life’
can mean everything and nothing at the same time.
On the other hand, it also bears a methodical func-
tion which we want to label Burstword II: The wide
understanding of life—literally—can help to deto-
nate narrowness in current research, where a disci-
plinary and/or conceptual tunnel view is not appro-
priate to the envisaged object or problem. In this
second, methodological sense, ‘life’ as Burstword II
is closely linked to transdisciplinarity as a general
research principle—as it has been defined by
Mittelstraß [87] and has been discussed in general
[66] as well as in the specific context of synthetic
biology [61, 62, 106].
From Opposition to Amalgamation: Natural
and Cultural Life
Aristotle’s complex understanding of life has led to
divisive discussions up to the present day, including
the explicit contention with his works from a current
point of view ([36]; [38]; [64], pp. 8–32). Besides the
controversies over the wide and narrow understandings
of life, there are debates about whether life and technol-
ogy can be understood as opposites or not. The notion of
‘fabrication of life’ is itself an example of this ambiva-
lence, because it raises not only fundamental doubts
about whether life could be the object of fabrication
but also the ontological question of whether the entities
of synthetic biology are living beings or artefacts. This
often-used opposition refers to Aristotle and adopts his
distinction between phýsis and téchne in a modern
sense: Living beings are defined as natural objects,
which have the source of their growth and movement
in themselves. In contrast, artefacts are seen as artificial
objects, which are fabricated by human beings and exist
only in relation to their use. They belong to culture
([13], p. 285, pp. 290–92). Do biological systems that
are produced by human technology belong to nature or
to culture? Some authors in the debate about the onto-
logical status of the objects of synthetic biology claim
that they have to be seen as a mixture of ‘natural’ and
‘cultural’ properties (ibid.; [28, 75]).
If this is right, synthetic biology shows us how prob-
lematic supposedly obvious dichotomies like nature and
technique or nature and culture actually are. If the mixed
character of synthetic biological systems is taken seri-
ously, all definitions of life that are based on the dual-
isms of nature and technique or nature and culture have
to be abandoned ([13], p. 290). It would follow that
synthetic biology does not take a reductionist approach
because culture would already be present in all natural
descriptions of life. On the contrary, the concept of life
belongs to a realm beyond the dualism of nature and
culture. Especially due to current developments in syn-
thetic biology, the strict distinction between life and
technology has become questionable ([58], p. 113).
Generally, moreover, in the history of philosophy as
well as in the present day, life can also be seen as a
concept that potentially bridges this distinction ([111],
pp. 83–85). Related to the insight that life cannot be
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defined biologically only, it is not surprising that this
argument leads to hermeneutical [13, 19] or even vital-
istic [28] interpretations of synthetic biology, which are
based on hermeneutical or vitalistic theories of life.
Also—as we have summarised in the previous
subsection—from a holistic point of view, the term ‘life’
involves aspects like (political) conduct in human soci-
eties or philosophical questions about the meaning of
human existence, which go far beyond biological
investigations.
A third historical development is of high significance
for current debates as well. Behind the notion of ‘fabri-
cation of life’—again in a somehow narrow understand-
ing of the term—stands the condensation of a long
tradition of modern scientific thinking. Many studies
mention the prehistory of the epistemological impera-
tive of synthetic biology. It goes back at least to the
seventeenth century, when—after 300 years of progress
in the production of mechanical gadgets and devices—a
general scientific research strategy was established in
the sciences ([97], p. 376; [44], pp. 762–773). Histori-
cally, the second main epoch in the European history of
biology after Aristotle started with Descartes. Here,
lived bodies are seen as technical automata without
any soul ([109], pp. 98–99). This notion has prefigured
the mechanistic understanding of life until today ([117],
p. 475). A constructivist—engineering-like—approach
is essential for modern scientific thinking and actions.
Synthetic biology introduces this epistemological prin-
ciple into a new realm, the realm of biology: designing
life as if it were a man-mademachine. If this definition is
granted, the groundbreaking aim of synthetic biology ‘is
to learn more about the living by means of reconstruc-
tion or fabricating it—in contrast to the analytical-
descriptive work that has, so far, been the most impor-
tant way of generating knowledge in biology’ ([97], p.
377; see also [1], pp. 9–10; [25], p. 42; [92], pp. 19–20;
[107], pp. 284–285; [111], pp. 76–78).
In the debate on synthetic biology, it is exactly this
combination—the engineering attitude with life forms
as its objects—which mostly represents both the poten-
tials and problems of this way of gaining and applying
scientifically relevant knowledge. Two of the main the-
oretical problems of this combination are already
prefigured in Aristotle’s influential work: the one re-
garding a wide and narrow meaning of life, and the
other, related question about amalgamations and border-
lines between nature and culture. The latter also includes
genuine modern historical leftovers, mainly influenced
by Descartes: a condensation of seventeenth century
thinking and the new controversy over ‘fabricating life’
or ‘living machines’, which leads to genuine ethical
challenges (‘Reveal a Scriptorium 4.0: Linguistic and
Biological Innovations of the ‘Genetic Code’ Meta-
phor’, ‘From Buzz to False Alarm: Fallacies Regarding
the Normative Effects of a Fabrication of ‘Life’’, ‘From
Misguiding Simplification to Respectful Complexity:
an Argument Regarding the Ethical Focus’ and ‘From
(Proto)Type to Hype: an Argument for and Against the
Pedagogical Side Effect of ‘LivingMachines’’). Phrases
like these cause conceptual challenges, since their usage
in current debates remains unclear. In the subsequent
third section, we turn to the dark side of the story and
focus on current debates in more detail in order to
emphasise the fuzzy, foggy and buzzy usage of
‘life’—which we want to call Burstword I.
From Buzz to Fuzz: the Dangers of the Unclear
and Metaphorical Use of ‘Life’
There is also a general discussion about the status of the
concept of life, adding other aspects to the already
discussed issues of culture and nature, wide and narrow
definitions, mechanistic and holistic worldviews. Some
authors question whether ‘life’ is a scientific term at all.
Others critically reflect on its role as buzzword in a
scientific area dominated by research funding and the
permanent struggle for attention and highlight the prob-
lematic aspects of its metaphorical use. In this section,
we focus on the risks of this use of the concept of life
and highlight the potential for ideological misuse. Broad
debates once again illustrate the umbrella status of the
term ‘life’ as well as the ongoing struggle for precise
scientific application of terminology in general.
No Need to Argue, No Need for Definitions
In June 2007, an editorial article in the journal Nature
claimed: ‘It would be a service to more than synthetic
biology if we might now be permitted to dismiss the
idea that life is a precise scientific concept’ ([46], p.
1032). Moreover, scientists assure us that ‘the impossi-
bility of a sharp distinction between animate and inan-
imate would not create difficulties for the biology in its
everyday scientific practice’ ([30], p. 101; [110], pp.
467–468). Thus, the possibility of a universal and pre-
cise biological definition of life is either not important,
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or simply impractical ([117], p. 474; [109], pp. 97–98, p.
102), or even pointless ([36]; [80], pp. 33–62). Life is
regarded as a ‘fuzzy concept’ and the notion that biolo-
gy allows a plurality of approaches to life appears to be
satisfying ([116], p. 37). Some scientists, like
Homberger, even claim that biologists have an intuitive
knowledge of the border between inanimate matter and
living beings but are not able to explain the phenomenon
of life physically [67]. Similarly, the philosopher Gayon
thinks that life could disappear as a scientific concept
and remain only as a ‘folk concept’ for our everyday
use. He claims:
When this point will be reached, life will be no
longer a concept for the natural sciences, but just a
convenient word in practice, in the world we
inhabit. ‘Life’will be a folk concept. Its specialists
will be no longer chemists, biologists, and
roboticists; life will be a subject for psychology,
cognitive science and anthropology. ([55], p. 243).
But Gayon does not only deny that there can be a
scientific definition of life in the strong sense. He also
assumes that ‘the recognition of ‘life’ has always been
and remains primarily an intuitive process, for the sci-
entists as for the layperson. However we should not
expect, then, to be able to draw a definition from this
original experience’ (ibid., p. 231). Against this back-
ground, it is not surprising that some criticise the fact
that the concept of life is only used as a buzzword to
draw attention in a world in which the selling of a
scientific result is as important as the result itself
([107], p. 276). Moreover, in its various linguistic vari-
ations, from ‘fabrication of life’ to ‘livingmachines’, the
term ‘life’ is used in a metaphorical way when it comes
to synthetic biology. It connotes technological progress,
funding opportunities, reputation in a certain field of
investigation and social and medical welfare, but it also
has an explicitly negative connotation for ‘playing god’,
loss of control, high risks and unforeseeable dangers.
The metaphorical treatment of ‘life’ relates (a) to a
plurality of concrete technical and scientific approaches
in synthetic biology (metaphor of fuzzy concepts), its
disappearance as scientific term (metaphor of folk con-
cept) or as a vague expression in certain funding con-
texts (metaphor of buzzword). Besides the usage of
‘life’ as a metaphor for something else, the other side
of the coin plays an important role in current debates as
well: metaphors that stand for life. For instance, the term
‘living machine’ not only does apply the term ‘life’ in a
metaphorical way but also expresses something about
life—not as the subject but as the object of the phrase.
Here ‘machine’ can be seen as a metaphor for life.
Another prominent example is the ‘genetic code’ meta-
phor. In this second sense, metaphors of life attract a
certain interest since they immediately touch on a field
of controversy that has been briefly introduced in ‘Life
Is Not Life: Aristotle’s Wide Concept of Life and the
Current Condensation of Modern Thinking in Synthetic
Biology’: Is, e.g. ‘living machine’ a metaphor for life in
the narrow sense of the word? Or is it a metaphor for
scientific nonsense, because a machine (= culture) can
never be alive (= nature)? Or vice versa: Is it a symbol
for postmodern plurality? And what is it today, after
synthetic biology has emerged as a dominant field? Is
it now a metaphor for the end of the ancient nature-
culture distinction and hence for the breakdown of tra-
ditional categories? This last question involves a poten-
tial loss of linguistic and practical orientation, which
easily engenders dangers of methodical nonsense in
scientific investigations or ideological misuse in public
debates. In fact, negative issues are often highlighted
when metaphors of life and life as metaphor are
discussed.
What Is the Meta for? Risks of Technomorphic
Metaphors in Uncertain Situations
To a large extent, the metaphors in synthetic biology
are borrowed from the fields of engineering, con-
struction and architecture, electrotechnics, informa-
tion theory or information technologies (IT), comput-
er science, design and theology ([29], pp. 70–71; [2],
pp. 83–95; [50], pp. 258–260; [81], pp. 19–24; [86]).
The technomorphic model of life—as we have al-
ready emphasised in ‘From Opposition to Amalgam-
ation: Natural and Cultural Life’—has been
established since Descartes and the seventeenth cen-
tury in terms of technical apparatus and automata
([109], pp. 99–100). Additionally, due to the engi-
neering approach, the newness and complexity of
synthetic biology is explained in mechanistic and
industrial analogies, and mainly in terms of technical
artefacts and industrial products, such as ‘living ma-
chines’, ‘designing life’ and ‘life as a toolbox’ [39,
43, 85, 93]. It is currently adverted that machine and
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engineering metaphors in synthetic biology are hid-
ing alternative evolutionary or ecological metaphors.
Hence, alternative technological and social develop-
ments in relation to synthetic biology are also
‘downplayed’ [21]. These metaphors depict—
again—how synthetic biology touches culturally
and normatively charged and deeply rooted distinc-
tions of living and not living matter (see ‘Life Is Not
Life: Aristotle’s Wide Concept of Life and the Cur-
rent Condensation of Modern Thinking in Synthetic
Biology’). In this situation of uncertainness and
blurred boundaries, which are characteristic for syn-
thetic biology, the vocabulary of ‘ontological chi-
meras’ and ‘hybrid practices’ is meant to help in
defining the epistemological and ontological status
of technically produced new life forms [91]. There-
fore, the use of metaphorical terms could be seen as
an
attempt to find forms of speech which make com-
municable the characteristics of the scientific field
and the targeted products, but it is also an indicator
of the uncertainty which synthetic biology creates
by propagating the crossing of the classical dis-
tinctions [84].
Furthermore, the mechanistic and technomorphic
metaphors in synthetic biology are interpreted as expres-
sions of an ontological constitution of a new world of
objects (‘Ontologisierung’) and therefore as the cause of
a potential change in our concept of life and of human
self-understanding [23]. Finally, metaphors such as
‘playing God’ and ‘creating life’ are taken as an indica-
tor of social discontent and moral irritation. In this view,
they are seen as ciphers on the surface of societal dis-
courses which refer to a deeper sociocultural dimension
in the debate on synthetic biology including fear and
‘Unbehagen’ (discontent) [96] and the symptoms of a
crisis of natural sciences ([27], pp. 19–23).
It is remarkable that the most metaphorical terms in
synthetic biology are associated with mere negative
connotations. They are, for instance, evaluated as ‘inad-
equate and avoidable’ ([29], p. 73) or even ‘disturbing’
([39], p. 34). Boldt et al. argue that a careless and non-
reflective use of metaphors could imply a dangerous
artificialisation of nature and therefore is a ‘real risk’
with regard to the ethical implications ([23], p. 55; [22]).
With respect to the description of CRISPR-Cas9 tech-
nologies, Ceccarelli concludes that
conceiving of technologies as living things might
be just as troubling because it takes responsibility
away from the people who are using those tech-
nologies and places it in the metaphoric hands of
the technologies themselves, absolving us of ac-
countability for the acts performed. ([33], p. 11)
Müller cautions about the ‘tempting suggestion of
life being controllable’ and emphasises the ethical and
bio-political challenges of such metaphors like ‘living
machines’ as ‘forms of knowledge’ that also ‘imply the
appropriate way to deal with those biotic entities’ [91].
Though Martern et al. concede a structuring, orienting
and active guiding function of metaphors, they also
emphasise ‘problematic […] further associations in-
voked by the metaphors and their background’ [84].
Overall, there seems to be agreement that there is a
risk—or even a danger—in using metaphors of life in
the scientific context as well as in public communica-
tion. For instance with respect to reporting practices in
two large German newspapers, a sociological investiga-
tion has lately revealed that the
newsworthiness of a revolutionary technology
and scientific discipline appears to determine the
semantics of news coverage […], while a respon-
sible use of metaphors and their possible implica-
tions is simply lacking and this constrains respon-
sible thinking as well. ([45], p. 14)
From a critical perspective on the rhetorical and
ideological dimensions, metaphors in science have the
ambivalence of ‘mythification’ if they are taken literally.
The metaphor then turns from a productive model of
thinking to a constraint of thinking that prevents scien-
tific insight rather than enabling it [42]. Venter [113]
claims that he created synthetic life when he ‘activated’
and ‘booted’ the synthetic genome in the bacterial cell.
But, not only does he presuppose a very limited, reduc-
tionist definition of life in order to create it, many critics
have denied that he created ‘life’ at all [35]. Due to the
indefinability of the term ‘life’, Schummer even argues
that the declaration of ‘constructing life’ as the goal of
scientific inquiry is neither achievable nor does it serve
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to increase scientific knowledge or technical benefit.
Hence, the claim of ‘making life’ is more for the sake
of gaining attention and grants than for the purpose of
formulating a scientific goal [104]. Therefore, whatever
might be meant by ‘creating/making/designing/con-
structing life’ or ‘writing/programming the code/
software of life’ in a scientific sense, it is certainly
over-ambitious and highly questionable to contend that
‘[s]ynthetic life will enable us to understand all life on
this planet and to enable new industries to produce food,
energy, water and medicine as we add 1 billion new
humans to earth every 12 years’ [113]. Here, metaphors
of life turn out to be (mis)used as ‘future-driven and
techno-utopian ways of scientific practice’ [91] and
rhetorical vehicles of dubious promises and unrealistic
visions, which contribute to a ‘Hope, Hype and Fear
Technology’ [98] and rule the ‘campaign of framing’ [3]
in the public debate on synthetic biology. Generally, the
unreflected usage of genetic metaphors at the cutting
edge between the scientific community and the public,
e.g. those of ‘genetic receipts’ in comparison to
‘cooking receipts’, bears dangers of misunderstandings
due to a lack of linguistic objectivity ([101], p. 65).
What we illustrate in this paper as buzz to burst
finds its first critical climax at this point of the story.
Foggy, ideologically misused, mythical phrases cre-
ate a methodologically unsatisfying and useless se-
mantic mud. A concrete meaning is hard to grasp
and therefore critical verification or falsification re-
mains impossible. Whereas the ‘buzz’ can somehow
productively support investigations in synthetic bi-
ology in the context of funding acquisition (life as
buzzword), incautious metaphorisation too easily
leads to a risky ‘burst’ of the semantic field. If a
strict scientific definition of life is not needed (‘folk
concept’), then metaphorical phrases do not really
support clear and straightforward scientific commu-
nication. In a non-methodological, negative sense,
life might become something we like to call
Burstword I since it erodes conceptual borderlines
and leads to a methodological lack of (semantic)
orientation. This is, so to speak, the dark side of
the story—life between buzzword, fuzzy concept,
folk concept and mythical metaphor, including ideo-
logical misuse. But there is also another very impor-
tant side. In the following sections, we will reveal,
step by step, another positive and methodologically
controllable impact of the term ‘life’ in synthetic
biology.
From Buzz to Boost: Naturalisation of Life and its
Methodological Reduction in Synthetic Biology
After having discussed some critical issues of the met-
aphorical use of the term ‘life’ as the fuzzy, foggy and
buzzy Burstword I, we will now reconstruct some pos-
itive aspects that lead us to the methodological meaning
of Burstword II. A crucial point is that from a language-
critical point of view the already-mentioned self-con-
ception/self-understanding of humanity plays an impor-
tant role in research. Here, the concrete ways of describ-
ing phenomena like ‘living machines’ involve a self-
explication of the concrete laboratory performances in
relation to an intended aim or more general theoretical
motivation. Whenever people talk about phenomena, a
self-explication is at least indirectly present in the con-
crete choice of words, descriptions, or—in our case—
technomorphic metaphors linked to ‘life’. Making the
self-explication explicit is one important task of philos-
ophy since language use is the primary object, and at the
same time also the tool of philosophical assessment.
Therefore, in the previous sections, we reconstructed
the historical background with respect to Aristotle (‘Life
Is Not Life: Aristotle’s Wide Concept of Life and the
Current Condensation of Modern Thinking in Synthetic
Biology’) and summarised some critical remarks on
metaphorical, fuzzy, foggy and buzzy speech (‘From
Buzz to Fuzz: the Dangers of the Unclear and Meta-
phorical Use of ‘Life’’). In the following section, we are
going to briefly illustrate the theoretical motivation of
synthetic biology—where the aim is to understand what
life is (‘Life as Theoretical Object of Synthetic Biolo-
gy’)—and its constructive epistemology (‘Engineering
Under an Umbrella: Epistemology of Synthetic Biology
and the Constructive Approach’). Here the self-
explication receives a methodologically more produc-
tive function, which can be applied to the innovative
function of metaphors as well (‘From Radiation to Re-
habilitation: the Positive Methodological Functions of
Metaphors of Life and Life as Metaphor’). Up to this
point, we treat the self-conception—which is linked to
the operational self-explication while using language—
in a genuine methodological sense. It is a precondition
of communication in the field. On the other hand, the
naturalisation of life—which is a trademark of success-
ful engineering methodology under the umbrella of
synthetic biology (‘Engineering Under an Umbrella:
Epistemology of Synthetic Biology and the Construc-
tive Approach’)—brings specific ethical challenges of a
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back projection to human life, which go beyond what
we call Burstword I. The reason can be found in IT
metaphors of ‘genetic information’, which easily lead
to the fallacy that human communication (exchange of
information in social situations) can be naturalised as
well (‘Reveal a Scriptorium 4.0: Linguistic and Biolog-
ical Innovations of the ‘Genetic Code’ Metaphor’).
Life as Theoretical Object of Synthetic Biology
It is important to mention that synthetic biology can also
be seen as an exception in the debate about life. Here,
the concept of life is not only used as buzzword or
anything similar but is also discussed theoretically.
Many scholars in the field—philosophers as well as
natural scientists and engineers—assure us that they
want to contribute to the basic understanding of life
([44], pp. 762–763). Due to experimental results like
the ‘synthetic cell’ created by Venter and his colleagues
[56], the debate on the question ‘What is life?’ has
reignited. Bedau, for instance, emphasises that ‘we
now have an unprecedented opportunity to learn about
life. Having complete control over the information in a
genome provides a fantastic opportunity to probe the
remaining secrets of how it works’ [8]. Others, like
Caplan, conclude that we have already learnt enough
to end an old and for a while forgotten debate:
Venter and his colleagues have shown that the
material world can be manipulated to produce
what we recognize as life. In doing so they bring
to an end a debate about the nature of life that has
lasted thousands of years. Their achievement un-
dermines a fundamental belief about the nature of
life that is likely to prove as momentous to our
view of ourselves and our place in Universe as the
discoveries of Galileo, Copernicus, Darwin and
Einstein. [32]
Here, again, we touch one of the conceptual fields that
have been introduced in ‘Life Is Not Life: Aristotle’sWide
Concept of Life and the Current Condensation of Modern
Thinking in Synthetic Biology’. The theoretical interest in
understanding what life is remains primarily narrow.
Broader meanings, as for instance social, political or moral
life and its ethical reflection, remain either secondary—e.g.
when interdisciplinary working groups emphasise the so-
cial consequences regarding risk management, medical
innovations or biopolitics—or are totally blended out.
Consequently, Venter claims that his synthetic genomics
approach will provide a reductionist explanation of
life ([34]; [44], p. 763). Since, as Morange puts it, ‘life is
on the way to being ‘naturalised’’, it thus seems ‘fully
accessible to scientific enquiry’ ([89], p. 181). In order to
understand the significance of synthetic biology for that
‘dramatic change’ (ibid.), we will consider epistemological
principles of synthetic biology in the following subsection.
Engineering Under an Umbrella: Epistemology
of Synthetic Biology and the Constructive Approach
Not only life is treated as either a narrow reductionist or
a wide umbrella term. ‘Synthetic biology’ also receives
an umbrella status since the field clusters a set of differ-
ent scientific and methodological disciplines that share a
constructive approach to their object ([14, 24]; [49], p.
6). In this respect, synthetic biology can be seen as a
new form and development of biotechnology. Both in
comparison and contrast to other biotechnologies, syn-
thetic biology systematically introduces engineering
concepts and methodologies like standardisation,
modularisation (‘BioBricks’) and hierarchical organisa-
tion into the field of biology ([20], pp. 391–392; [25],
pp. 31–32; [44], p. 772; [49], p. 4; [59], pp. 189–190;
[81], pp. 29–30). Moreover, as both practitioners and
theoreticians of synthetic biology emphasise, synthetic
biology research has a creative and technologically in-
novative aim: Novel products with useful functions
should be designed in a rational manner ([20], p. 392;
[24], p. 35–39)—it is at this point where technomorphic
metaphors could also contribute to new research strate-
gies (see ‘From Radiation to Rehabilitation: the Positive
Methodological Functions of Metaphors of Life and
Life as Metaphor’). At best, the human-designed bio-
logical systems cannot be found in nature and cannot
genetically interact with natural organisms. Therefore,
the concepts of ‘xeno-life’ and ‘recorded life’ are
emphasised in the orthogonal approach. The aim is
to create cells that are unable to exchange genetic
information with natural organism either by inte-
grating non-natural molecular compounds (xeno-
life) or by reassignment of the natural genetic code
(recoded life). ([25], p. 30; see also ibid., pp. 36-47
and [49], p. 7)
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Xeno nucleic acids (XNAs), synthetic nucleic acid
analogues, have been developed as the artificial pendant
to DNA and are intended to serve as something like a
‘genetic firewall’, because XNA molecules are not sup-
posed to be biochemically incompatible to DNA mole-
cules of natural organisms ([25], p. 33, p. 39, pp. 43–45;
[82, 100, 102]). With biochemical means, the design of
synthetic cells should lead to genetically non-natural
forms of life that are termed ‘xeno-life’.
Briefly speaking, with synthetic biology, engineers—
but also computer scientists—are entering biology and
bringing along an epistemological model of biological
research. Synthetic biology is not only the application of
theoretical knowledge but also the ‘fabrication’ of bio-
logical systems should also lead to a better understand-
ing of their composition and functioning. The phrase
‘knowledge through fabrication’ ([97], p. 377) summa-
rises the methodological approach of the various forms
of synthetic biology ([75], pp. 160–161)—such as the
aforementioned notion of ‘fabricating life’. To sum up
their attitude, several scientists refer to Richard
Feynman’s saying: ‘What I cannot create, I do not
understand’ ([44], p. 762; [97], p. 377; [115], p. 17;
[1], p. 14, p. 24; [92], pp. 3ff.; [107], S. 279).
If life is going to be engineered or programmed as an
artificial—still organic but non-natural—tool, what does
this mean for concepts of evolution that so dramatically
changed our understanding of natural life since the
nineteenth century? Toepfer reflects on the impact of
evolution on the notion of both ‘life’ and ‘machine’. He
emphasises the tension between life as a value-laden
reflexive term on the one hand and ‘life’ as a descriptive
concept within biological research in the debate on
synthetic biology on the other ([111], p. 71). He rejects
the full relevance of genealogical trees and phylogeny to
future definitions of natural life:
After the creation of the first synthetic organism,
the universal genealogical connection of living
beings will be the restricted empirical criterion
only for life as it can be found in nature (natural
life), and not for life per se. (ibid., p. 86)
Toepfer concludes that ‘with the creation of living
machines synthetic biology will not necessarily
strengthen our purely mechanistic view of life but rather
broaden our concept of machines’ (ibid., p. 82). The
somehow narrow understanding of life in synthetic bi-
ology can also be illustrated by its fixation on individual
objects. For technical reasons of means-end fulfilling
functionality, even the status of evolution becomes
questionable for the products of synthetic biology:
the sequence of organisms in time and the possi-
bility of evolution is rather neglected, or, for rea-
sons of safety and sustainable use, even intention-
ally suppressed. Life in synthetic biology is the
reproducible set of functions and activities
resulting from the composition of individual or-
ganisms that ideally remains the same across gen-
erations. (ibid., p. 84)
Loos comes to a similar conclusion. Attempts to
understand life by recreating it can be realised by fol-
lowing the minimal cell approach. Here it is aimed to
realise ‘the smallest possible’ but still functioning cellu-
lar life form, following the assumption that life relates to
very concrete functions like replication and protein syn-
thesis that are precisely located at certain genes. There-
fore, capacities for evolutional development have been
functionally decreased, or even eliminated, such as the
connection to phylogenetic trees ([79], pp. 37–41).
The constructivist approach of synthetic biology does
not only influence a reductionist, naturalised and theo-
retical understanding of what life means. Additionally, it
adds a similarly narrow concept of evolution to the
methodological and linguistic toolbox of current biolo-
gy: evolution becomes a controllable parameter. Espe-
cially, in its methodological motivations, the narrow
treatment of life and evolution is ethically not bad per
se. Instead, concrete methodological requirements of
scientific—or in the field of synthetic biology even
technoscientific [53, 90, 92]—engagement call for this
streamlined, although limited, understanding of life. In
‘From Misguiding Simplification to Respectful Com-
plexity: an Argument Regarding the Ethical Focus’, we
will show that this does not automatically lead to any
disrespect of life as such (in the wide sense) and that
practical complexity is increased at the same time. Con-
crete ethical assessment of specific applications of syn-
thetic biology, its research practice and terminology,
remains an ethical challenge—besides the pros and cons
of a fundamental objection to the narrow treatment of
life. Moreover, as we will show in the subsequent ‘From
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Radiation to Rehabilitation: the Positive Methodologi-
cal Functions of Metaphors of Life and Life as Meta-
phor’, positive methodical functions of metaphorical
speech in synthetic biology can also be revealed. What
remains an ethically critical issue is the clash of ‘matter
of fact’ and ‘matter of ought’ if naturalised speech is not
only linked to technical functions of ‘living machines’
but also linked to human cultural life. Due to the mas-
sive usage of IT metaphors like ‘genetic information’,
the naturalisation of human communication as if it were
only the exchange of factual information also affects
speech about ‘life’. The ethical pitfall can be found in
the risk that these semantic influences from the IT side
are overlooked due to the primary focus on ‘life’ in the
debate (‘Reveal a Scriptorium 4.0: Linguistic and Bio-
logical Innovations of the ‘Genetic Code’ Metaphor’).
From Radiation to Rehabilitation: the Positive
Methodological Functions of Metaphors of Life
and Life as Metaphor
As is seen in ‘From Buzz to Fuzz: the Dangers of the
Unclear and Metaphorical Use of ‘Life’’, an evaluation
of the metaphorical speech of ‘life’ as disturbing, risky,
dangerous, inadequate and/or ideological mystification
has a long tradition in the contempt and criticism of
metaphors in science. In order to prepare the ethical
arguments in ‘From Buzz to False Alarm: Fallacies
Regarding the Normative Effects of a Fabrication of
‘Life’’ and to further emphasise the epistemological
aspects summarised in ‘From Buzz to Boost:
Naturalisation of Life and Its Methodological Reduction
in Synthetic Biology’, we will now focus on another
side of the use of metaphors in synthetic biology: the
methodological benefit in the context of cognitive and
innovative functions, non-propositional truth criteria,
paradigmatic changes of research approaches, theories
and terminology. Metaphors play an important role for
the inherent dynamics of research and development
insofar as they can also be seen as driving forces in
epistemic boundary crossing (Burstword II, ‘Reveal
the Revolution: Methodologically Controlled use of
Metaphors as Metaphors’). We briefly reframe these
issues with respect to the metaphor of the ‘genetic code’
in ‘Reveal a Scriptorium 4.0: Linguistic and Biological
Innovations of the ‘Genetic Code’ Metaphor’. Here
also, the need to explicate metaphors as metaphors is
accentuated—this time with a focus on a reductionist
naturalisation and self-explication that is already inher-
ently included in IT vocabulary.
Reveal the Revolution: Methodologically Controlled
Use of Metaphors asMetaphors
Against the background of the ideal of a deductive logic
of explanation, metaphors as well as models, the scien-
tific counterpart of metaphors, were rejected as mere
ornamental and heuristic aids rather than rational instru-
ments of theoretical explanation [42, 65]. But with the
crisis of such a rationalistic ideal, as it has been postu-
lated and introduced by philosophers of science like
Kuhn, metaphorical terms and model explanations were
also reevaluated and rehabilitated [76]. Authors like
Black and Hesse argued for a constitutive role and
cognitive content of metaphors and models in scientific
explanation and paradigm shifts [15, 65]. According to
Black, theoretical models in science, understood as ‘ex-
plicit metaphors’ [16], introduce a new perspective and
new vocabulary to speak about things. They initiate an
analogical transfer of isomorphic relations from an al-
ready known and familiar domain to a new and un-
known domain of scientific investigation on a rational
basis ([15], pp. 238–239).
Hesse calls this function the ‘redescription of the
domain of the explanandum’ ([65], p. 157). In this
process of redescription, metaphors and models are
closely linked and serve as a constitutive base and
driving force on the level of scientific paradigms and
research programs: ‘Scientific revolutions are, in fact,
metaphoric revolutions, and theoretical explanation
should be seen as metaphoric redescription of the do-
main of phenomena’ ([5], p. 156). Therefore, metaphors
are not mere ornamental and irrational epiphenomena of
research but rather can be seen as an inevitable condition
and rationale of scientific innovation and progress with a
specific cognitive function [26, 78, 83]. Zwart discusses
the imaginative function of the metaphorical analogy
‘between synthetic cell diagrams and mandalas [which]
not only pertain to the role of the object […], but also to
the subject pole (the researcher […]).’ ([118], p. 14).
However, this fundamental epistemic function of meta-
phors does not imply that they are infallible and innoc-
uous at all. Metaphorical shifts and transfer processes,
although they are based on cognitive and rational anal-
ogies, are not deductive and fully controllable [42].
They serve as non-propositional criterion of ‘rightness’
[57], which Arbib and Hesse call a ‘‘pragmatic criterion’
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plus ‘ideology’’ ([5], p. 159). Furthermore, due to the
selective ‘highlighting and hiding’ function [77], they
also carry the risk of mythification and misuse [11, 12,
112] (see ‘What Is the Meta for? Risks of
Technomorphic Metaphors in Uncertain Situations’).
At this point, the need for a methodologically controlled
reflection on metaphors as metaphors in scientific in-
quiry as well as in public debates is evident, but it is still
a controversial and challenging task ([42]; [69], pp.
106–112).
Besides critical aspects and risks, one can also figure
out an innovative, creative, pragmatically useful and
even revolutionary function [41, 72] and epistemic
normativity of metaphors as conditions and driving
forces of scientific inquiry, technological progress and
societal discourses. Metaphors (and models) in this per-
spective appear as constitutive moments of paradigm
shifts in the research process on all levels of theory
building; practical norms of science; technological de-
velopment; and the accompanying political, social and
ethical discourses. In the current debate, for example,
Szymanski has opened up the opportunity to replace
passive machine metaphors in synthetic biology by
more active descriptions of microorganisms as ‘partici-
pators’. This might open up new experimental directions
[108]. Generally, a metaphorological analysis of syn-
thetic biology has to include the diachronic-historical
perspective on the genealogy of a metaphor as well as
the synchronic dimension of the systematic-ethical
consequences—as has been emphasised, e.g. by
Blumenberg [17] and Weinrich [114]. The diachronic-
historical perspective often includes one or both of the
two lines of conflict we introduced with respect to
Aristotle in ‘Life Is Not Life: Aristotle’s Wide Concept
of Life and the Current Condensation of Modern Think-
ing in Synthetic Biology’. For instance, in their recent
s t udy, Ma te rn e t a l . [84 ] p rov ide such a
metaphorological attempt on the genesis and systematic
implications of ‘living machine’ as a leading metaphor
of synthetic biology. They locate the historical origin of
this metaphor in Kant’s conception of life, which con-
tains an epistemological and ontological reflection on
the line between organism and machine and marks ‘a
point of condensation where the shifting of boundaries,
the eruption of the previous distinction becomes observ-
able and processable’.1 According to the authors, this
metaphorically generated tension which bears the gap
and undissolvable ‘surplus’ that differentiates living
organisms from artificial machines is still present in
the use of the metaphor ‘living machine’ in synthetic
biology. Furthermore, it also carries some ethical
challenges:
For ethical research, the dealing with the ambigu-
ity of this metaphor allows on the one hand to try
to get to the bottom of the determination of bound-
aries between a mechanization of life and a vital-
ization of the machine, on the other hand it allows
to examine the relation of such an ethical determi-
nation of boundaries to the self-concept of the
researchers in synthetic biology […]. (ibid., p. 57)
Besides the innovative function and epistemic
normativity, two more functions can be differentiated
as well. A reflexive critical function of metaphors lies in
its potential to open up new perspectives by introducing
alternative description languages that can correct
established theoretical concepts. Thirdly, an argumenta-
tive function relates to ‘metaphors as truth-apt state-
ments’ in the praxis of social reasoning ([50], p. 258,
p. 263). Function two and three can be seen as concrete
facets of the overarching innovative function. Meta-
phors also have important didactic functions when it
comes to the popularisation of sophisticated scientific
concepts. For instance, the metaphor of a ‘genetic pro-
gram’ or ‘receipt’ is useful for this purpose—even if
there still remains a lot of inaccuracy in the details
([101], pp. 60–61; see also [37] and [40], pp. 581–
582). Another example is the interface between science
and the public or developers and users in manuals and
technical documentation [54].
Reveal a Scriptorium 4.0: Linguistic and Biological
Innovations of the ‘Genetic Code’ Metaphor
Another influential metaphor in synthetic biology is the
‘genetic code’, respectively ‘DNA as the software of
life’ and the accompanied semantic fields of ‘reading’,
‘writing’ and ‘information’. If one is willing to relate it
to the nowadays often-used ‘industry 4.0’ phrase, it
might also be possible to talk about a biological ‘scrip-
torium 4.0’. However, from a metaphorological per-
spective, the story, from the discovery of DNA in the
middle of the twentieth century to the synthesis of a
whole bacterial genome by the Venter team, is also the
1 Here the distinction between physis, nature, techné and technology
made since the ancient philosophy is meant.
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success story of a metaphor. It is the story from reading
the genetic code to writing DNA in digital code of bits
and bytes (‘scriptorium 4.0’). Keller and Kay both point
out that it is not only the metaphor of the ‘book of
nature’ that sets the background concept for reading
and writing the genetic code but also the technological
and practical dimensions of research, the information
discourse in computer science and cybernetics and fi-
nally the political and social context of the cold war and
the human genome project, which strongly influenced
the history of biology in the middle of the twentieth
century—and are contained, one could say encoded, in
the metaphor of the genetic code [71, 73].
The historical origin of the genetic code metaphor is
Schrödinger’s influential book What is life? The Physi-
cal Aspect of the Living Cell, dating back to a hom-
onymic series of lectures in Dublin and published in
1944 [103]. With his pioneering work, Schrödinger
introduced the metaphor of the ‘genetic code’ and there-
by significantly influenced the further history of modern
molecular biology and genetics [52]. Blumenberg de-
scribes Schrödinger’s metaphorical invention as an ep-
isode within a metaphorological history of the legibility
of the world ([18], pp. 372–409). The genetic code,
descended from the old script metaphor of the ‘book
of nature’—and today turning into a ‘scriptorium 4.0’—
here fulfils the function of closing the gap between
metaphor and model, i.e. the transition from initially
struggling with different metaphorical models of expla-
nation to a hypothetical scheme that drives scientific
research and initiates a paradigm shift. According to
Blumenberg, biochemistry and genetics were successful
not least because Schrödinger’s metaphorical idea was
taken literally (ibid., pp. 376–379). This is obviously
true for synthetic biology. Seventy years later, Venter
held an anniversary lecture in Dublin with the titleWhat
is life? He described the conceptual background of his
view of synthetic biology and what he thought he was
actually doing by creating a bacterial cell: ‘I describe
DNA as the software of life and when we activate a
synthetic genome in a recipient cell I describe it as
booting up a genome, the same way we talk about
booting up a software in a computer’ [113]. Venter
refers directly to Schrödinger’s metaphor and
reformulates it into computer terminology. In his view,
he takes the metaphor of the genetic code literally and
does not only see DNA as the software of life but also
actually (re)writes this code. Based on his perspective
on telling the story from reading to writing the genetic
code, one could say that Venter’s experiments are a
demonstration of the innovative and revolutionary pow-
er of metaphors in scientific inquiry and technological
developments—the genetic code metaphor was literally
brought to life.
As we have illustrated throughout this paper so far,
the technomorphic metaphors in the debate about life
receive some criticism due to the risks of mystification,
misuse or nonsense (‘What Is the Meta for? Risks of
Technomorphic Metaphors in Uncertain Situations’).
Furthermore, the reductionist explanations of synthetic
biology have been criticised insofar as they need to be
substantially complemented if the aim is to grasp a more
holistic understanding of life (‘From Holism to Reduc-
tion and Far Beyond: Wide and Narrow Understandings
of Life’). But what also often remains overlooked in the
debate on ‘life’ is the other side of the coin: the
naturalisation and reductionism that is already inherent
to information technological speech. Even before any IT
metaphor is applied to ‘life’, the IT-traversed terminol-
ogy of ‘booting’, ‘reading’ or ‘writing a code’ contains a
peculiar naturalisation of human communication which
is criticised for instance by Janich from a language-
critical and culturalistic point of view. In a misleading
way, the relations between information and life are
turned upside down when it is argued that phrases like
‘genetic information’ are not anthropomorphic meta-
phors but rather realistic object-related descriptions—
as in the aforementioned case of Venter. Here, not only
is the term life used in a reductionist way; the computer
scientific side of the coin—the terms ‘information’ or
‘code’—also receives an inadequately naturalised con-
notation. In a strong naturalistic sense, information ap-
pears as if it were the object of natural history and
therefore the object of biology, physics or chemistry
([69], pp. 106–107).
This misleading development overlooks the reality
that information is not a natural fact. Information is
rooted in the cultural praxis of communication and rests
on human interactions such as dialogical speech. Talk
about ‘genetic information’, and beliefs that information
is the result of a natural process of evolution, run into a
tension: How do you explain the fact that humans refer
to ‘life’ or ‘information’ meaningfully in a social con-
text, if information or life as such is only the result of
natural history and therefore only a matter of natural
facts? And this tension applies to the scientist herself:
She would have to explain her own speech act of
explaining the overarching naturalisation as an incident
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of natural evolution and not as an argument within the
debates within a scientific community. Here, a critical
perspective on the self-understanding of the researcher
opens up also from a methodological point of view.
(From a different point of view, in ‘From (Proto)Type
to Hype: an Argument for and Against the Pedagogical
Side Effect of ‘Living Machines’’, some critical ethical
remarks on the pedagogical self-explication will be
added as well.) Yet, as long as the metaphorical speech
is made explicit and treated in a methodically adequate
way, there remains no need to ban metaphorical speech
about life or information in scientific engagement (ibid.,
pp. 111–112; [70], p. 610).
In a more traditional formulation, ethical problems
arise at the related cutting edge between ‘life’/‘informa-
tion’ as descriptive terms and ‘life’/‘information’ as
value-laden reflexive concepts. Here the short-sighted
jump from matters of fact to matters of human autono-
my, morality or social practices can only be realised for
the sake of Hume’s Law ([68] Book 3, Part I, Section 1)
or the so-called naturalistic fallacy [88]. The confronta-
tion of ‘life’ and IT-traversed terminology on the other
hand also makes an unexpected point, since it illustrates
the power of ‘life’ as Burstword II. Here ‘life’ in its
obviously wide meaning bursts the inadequate narrow
understanding of information as a natural incident. IT-
oriented terms are part of the technomorphic metaphors
of life. Vice versa, ‘life’ can also be seen as a part of the
anthropomorphic metaphors of information and there-
fore detonate the conceptual and disciplinary narrowing
of information technologies, where its link to the human
lifestyle of communication has been lost.
In the sense of methodologically controlled use, the
innovative, paradigm-changing power of metaphors,
combined with their critical and argumentative func-
tions, relates exactly to the positive side of the story
(which finds its negative counterpart in ‘From Buzz to
Fuzz: the Dangers of the Unclear and Metaphorical Use
of ‘Life’’). Whereas in a methodologically non-
controlled way, metaphors quickly turn into fuzzy, fog-
gy and buzzy clouds of ideological misuse, or every-
thing and nothing (Burstword I), in a methodologically
considered way they also support important inherent
dynamics of processes of scientific investigation
(Burstword II). What remains an open issue, which
cannot be answered in this paper, is the question of the
concrete ways in which the innovative use of metaphors
can be methodologically controlled in all respects. Nor
can we address the methodological and epistemological
issue of investigating life in transdisciplinary research
groups (with and without using fuzzy and folk concepts,
buzzwords, metaphors of life or life as metaphor).
We now turn to the ethical aspect of discourses of life
within and about synthetic biology. Several links to
genuine ethical problems have been mentioned already,
especially the conflict between matter of fact (empirical-
descriptive speech about life) and ‘matter of ought’
(normative-reflexive speech about life) that follows
from the amalgamation between nature and culture in
synthetic biology. This conflict might be avoided with a
strict reductionist usage of ‘life’ (narrow understanding)
in biology or an explicitly wide usage that is widespread
in ethics, where life as a moral way of life is the genuine
object of investigation. The crucial question is: Are we
aware that ‘living machines’, ‘artificial life’ or ‘genetic
information’ are metaphors for a limited treatment of
life, which cannot be applied to human ways of life?
After having emphasised the opportunities and pitfalls
of reductionist and naturalised speech in synthetic biol-
ogy, we turn to a self-critical view of ethics as well.
Therefore, in the following section, we present some
arguments related to ethical fallacies regarding a mis-
leading ethical fundamentalism and even ethical pseu-
do-problems.
From Buzz to False Alarm: Fallacies
Regarding the Normative Effects of a Fabrication
of Life
Synthetic biology is concerned not only with living, in
terms of disassembling, analysing andmaybemodifying
it but also and especially with engineering and creating
life. Due to this technical and manufacturing paradigm,
the whole emerging field of research is often presented
as a kind of new technoscience that deals with the
artificial creation of life in the laboratory or a similar
working space [53, 90, 92]. Thereby, the term
‘technoscience’ itself can be seen as a metaphor not only
for the intimate amalgamation of laboratory technolo-
gies and scientific research but also for the ethical non-
neutrality of synthetic biology (we note that non-
neutrality is a general characteristic of every technical
praxis). There is no research practice without technical,
constructive actions. And wherever humans act inten-
tionally, ethical concerns, e.g. of responsibility, may
potentially arise. In particular, next to the metaphorical
issues, the more fundamental claim of ‘fabricating life’
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is the especial focal point of concern and critique from
an ethical perspective. Philosophers and ethicists who
observe and assess the field are discussing one of the
key issues of synthetic biology under the umbrella of the
notion of ‘life creation’ [9, 22]—alongside ‘life’ and
‘synthetic biology’, this is now the third umbrella con-
cept, this time in a genuine ethical context. As we have
seen, the usage of life—as a fuzzy, foggy and buzzy
Burstword I as well as folk concept, umbrella term,
theoretical concept or methodologically explicated met-
aphor (Burstword II)—plays a crucial role in the ELSA-
discussion and in the public debate. Two main types of
objections to the aim of creating life in an artificial way
are advanced from an ethical perspective. The first ob-
jection refers to the conceptual dimension of the para-
digm of life in synthetic biology. Here it can be argued
that the awareness of the reductionist treatment of life
increases the respect for real life in its many complex
facets. At the same time, ethical problems are also linked
to a growing practical complexity, which goes along
with operat ional ‘black-box ’ knowledge in
technoscientific working groups. In this context, we
combine the three umbrellas mentioned in this paper
(life, synthetic biology and ‘life creation’, as the ethical
one) and present an argument for how life as Burstword
II also affects a reductionist understanding of ethical
problems. The second objection refers to the more prac-
tical or consequentialist implications of the very concept
of life and living. Here again in an outline of a concrete
argumentative sequence, the function of ‘life’ as
Burstword II can be illustrated with respect to its bor-
derlines with the concept of ‘machine’.
From Misguiding Simplification to Respectful
Complexity: an Argument Regarding the Ethical Focus
As we have illustrated with respect to the current debate
the very concept of life in synthetic biology arouses
criticism and contradiction. Let us at this point reframe
the first type of ethical objection and start with the
assumption that it is feared that, when dealing with life
forms, the dominant science-oriented paradigm of syn-
thetic biology has negative consequences for the con-
cept and understanding of life and living in general.
According to that criticism, which addresses a sort of
ontological question on a descriptive level, the method-
ological strategy of synthetic biology leads to problems
on a conceptual level. Thus, synthetic biology’s meth-
odo logy, which is s t rongly shaped by the
aforementioned pragmatic engineer’s approach (see
‘Engineering Under an Umbrella: Epistemology of Syn-
thetic Biology and the Constructive Approach’), repre-
sents and reinforces epistemically a misguided reduc-
tionist conception of life. Avery fundamental version of
this objection highlights the fact that every arrangement
and observation of living phenomena in an experimental
manner, in an artificial setting like a laboratory, can
reveal only a very special and limited view of and
insight into life—which needs to be complemented by
ethical reflections on cultural, political or social ways of
life. In the background—once again—stands the differ-
ence between a wider Aristotelian understanding of life
and a narrower and reductionist understanding in syn-
thetic biology, as introduced in ‘Life Is Not Life:
Aristotle’s Wide Concept of Life and the Current Con-
densation of Modern Thinking in Synthetic Biology’.
According to this view, experimental research in
the laboratory—or a similar workspace—will never
show what life ‘as such’ actually is—however, there
might be no need for biologists to define life at all (see
‘No Need to Argue, No Need for Definitions’). For
this sceptical position, it is clear and almost self-
explanatory that life is always more than what a re-
ductionist view or a view focused on some aspects of it
could explain. Life-definition scepticism can thus
support a holistic understanding of life that regards
life as an elusive, holistic entity which can never be
explained completely. Since there will always be an
unattainable remainder, life holists often advance vi-
talistic interpretations of life (see ‘From Opposition to
Amalgamation: Natural and Cultural Life’). This crit-
ical position is not without merit: The idea of separat-
ing, disassembling and modularising living systems in
small and smallest possible parts reinforces the cri-
tique of holistic life-definition sceptics. The tool kit
pattern, the metaphor of life as a ‘tool box’ and the
concept of the BioBricks illustrate that modularisation
and standardisation of life are important aspects of the
scientific approach to life. Such a view is incompatible
with seeing life as a complex, whole and indivisible
entity. From a holistic point of view, concentrating on
the minimal preconditions of life’s functioning as an
epistemic way to figure out what life is, as top-down
synthetic biology proposes, is thus misguided from
the beginning. Ignoring life’s specific intangibility by
claiming to exercise total controllability is also
condemned to failure. Life holists argue that these
failures rest on a misapprehension of what life is.
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Yet it is doubtful if the methodological reductionism
in synthetic biology can be connected with the compre-
hensive claim of explaining life ‘as such’. As mentioned
in ‘No Need to Argue, No Need for Definitions’, a
definition of life as such is not seen as necessary from
the perspective of practitioners. The reductionist view of
life is introduced and established for specific purposes,
for purposes of building and engineering, not for
apprehending the essence of life or for explaining life
in its full range and complexity. (There are, however,
exceptions, such as Venter’s statements that advance an
overarching understanding of life with reductionist
means; see ‘What Is the Meta for? Risks of
Technomorphic Metaphors in Uncertain Situations’
and ‘Life as Theoretical Object of Synthetic Biology’)
There are at least two facts that can count as an indica-
tion for this. First, the importance of biosafety issues in
synthetic biology is probably not denied by any serious
scientist in the field [99]. This illustrates that there is a
strong awareness concerning the limits of controlling
living entities. And second, there are scientists in syn-
thetic biology who are indicating a necessary broaden-
ing of the range of their own activity by using the term
‘tinkering’ [10, 105]. Thereby, the methodological pro-
cedure is to be supplemented with the principle of trial
and error, which comprises a kind of reacting and
cooperating with the living material and its contingency,
rather than determining and commanding it. In this, the
‘tinkering synthetic biologists’ are also acknowledging
certain predictive limits that emerge from working with
living objects in principle. In this sense, the designing,
synthesising and engineering of artificial life forms can
only be successful if it reckons with a certain internal
dynamics of the living [63]. Regarding this dimension
of a certain natural originality and obstinacy or self-will,
one could instead come to the opposite conclusion: by
doing synthetic biology, the respect and estimation of
the living is reinforced rather than weakened.
This insight correlates to another somehow para-
doxical observation: due to its bottom-up, trial-and-
error and tinkering character, it can be argued that,
under the umbrella of synthetic biology, practical
complexity is in fact increasing instead of being
reduced. Nordmann, for instance, has shown that
the many very pragmatic tools and procedures in
synthetic biology cause a multifaceted range of oper-
ational knowledge that cannot be explained with the
analytical approach of systems biology. Instead, the
non-theorised practical ‘black-box’ knowledge plays
an ever more important role [92]. Both the respect for
life and for operational and technical skills are rein-
forced. Here all three ‘umbrellas’—to use this meta-
phor as another methodological illustration—meet in
a remarkable way: (1) Both reinforcements men-
tioned are related to the many approaches that are
practically performed under the umbrella of synthetic
biology. (2) ‘Life’ remains an umbrella since it cap-
tures the reductionist, theoretically controllable
meaning of ‘life’ as well as the diverse aspects of
‘life’ that are the object of practical engagement
without a perfect logical or analytical explanation
(‘black-box’ character, tinkering). (3) The ethical
umbrella of ‘life creation’ relates concretely to the
respect for ‘life’ in practical engagement, and here
especially to the responsibility that is inherent in all
human (intentional) actions. Methodologically, ‘life’
serves as Burstword II when the reductionist under-
standing of life is made explicit and is either
sceptically deconstructed and/or leads to a broaden-
ing of the disciplinary or conceptual focus, wherever
this focus remains inadequate to its object. Concrete-
ly, this means that for the meeting point of the three
umbrellas in this line of argumentation, ‘life’ is burst-
ing the narrow disciplinary focus of systems biology
as well as analytic top-down approaches and
expanding it to the realm of technoscientific labora-
tories in synthetic biology. In conclusion, both an
epistemic shift from theoretical top-down knowledge
to practical bottom-up knowledge and a shift within
the ethical problematisation can be observed: the
reductionist understanding of ‘life’ does not primar-
ily remain the object of a fundamentally ethical cri-
tique. Instead, it illustrates the need for specific and
applied ethical assessments of concrete research ac-
tions in the field. ‘Life creation’ appears to be a
Burstword II insofar as it—literally—detonates a
misleading ethical fundamentalism or imprecise re-
ductionist focus—or even more, maybe also, ethical
pseudo-problems. Ethical assessment becomes more
complex insofar as it is required to bring a complex
technoscientific praxis into focus. Philosophical lan-
guage critique as it is applied to the self-expression of
the researcher and the restraint of any naturalised
speech when it comes to human social ways of life
(Hume’s Law or Moore’s naturalistic fallacy) are
concrete tools for the applied ethical assessment
(‘Reveal a Scriptorium 4.0: Linguistic and Biological
Innovations of the ‘Genetic Code’ Metaphor’).
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From (Proto)Type to Hype: an Argument for and
Against the Pedagogical Side Effect of ‘Living
Machines’
A second ethical objection is related to another line of
argumentation, which we want to portray with an em-
phasis on reservations regarding a certain attitude to-
ward living objects. Here the technologically determin-
istic paradigm in synthetic biology of controlling, con-
structing and creating the living cannot only be criticised
in a descriptive or ontological way as a fundamentally
misguided research approach; questionable effects in
normative regards might also be criticised. The assump-
tion is that, according to the dominant premise in the
field of synthetic biology, living beings can be taken
apart in minimal functional components out of which
completely novel living systems can be reassembled
from scratch, independently of natural standards. Be-
sides the descriptive objections, the engineering ap-
proach of modularisation and standardisation, of parti-
tion and building, of deconstructing and reconstructing,
obviously has practical implications. These practical
implications concern the ways of doing synthetic biolo-
gy and give occasion to criticism on a prescriptive level.
Doing science under the label of synthetic biology al-
ways implies a certain mode of working with living
entities. This mode of handling the living is strongly
shaped by the technical, productional and instrumental
paradigm (see ‘Engineering Under an Umbrella: Epis-
temology of Synthetic Biology and the Constructive
Approach’) that determines synthetic biology and thus
leads to ethical problems. The disputable norms of ac-
tion are consequences of the understanding of the living.
By seeing life as a result of a technological process of
production, which is activated for arbitrary purposes, a
manipulative and instrumental approach to the outcome
of the production is predefined. Inevitably, the products
of synthetic biology—which are by definition alive—
would thereby be subject to a way of handling as inan-
imate artefacts that does not acknowledge any value for
its own sake [48]. Synthetic biology (and biotechnology
in general) could be confronted with such an attitude of
a technical-instrumental use that is not compatible with
living objects in principle because it does not acknowl-
edge any intrinsic value the living may have. Thus, even
the designing and engineering of microorganisms from
scratch means a devaluation of these basal life forms.
This apprehension of instrumentalisation and debase-
ment of life and natural values goes beyond particular
living systems. In further consequence—it might be
argued—it leads to negative retroaction and a certain
ethical impact on how life in general is understood and
valued. In a temporal respect, this fear concerns effects
in the present as well as in the future. Following this, as a
current impact, it is assumed that if low or rudimentary
forms of living organisms are treated like non-living
material without any intrinsic value, as they belong to
the sphere of the living, the status of other living
objects—that are not only bacteria or yeast—could also
diminish as a (pedagogical) side effect. This would
imply a weakening of the respect for higher forms of
life that are usually regarded as worthy of respect and
protection. If man is practising the instrumentalisation
and exploitation of low life forms, and gets used to it, the
moral barrier to the inclusion of higher organisms in the
paradigm of technical-instrumental engineering and fab-
rication decreases. In the course of a process of habitu-
ation to the usage of the living, even life forms that are
commonly worth protecting would, step by step, lose
their state of intrinsic value, and the morally dangerous
effect of a general brutalisation is expected. Following
that line of slippery-slope argumentation, it can be pre-
dicted, as a further consequence, that this development
would finally lead, by implication, to changes in the
moral appreciation and status of humans. Arguments
like these are already known from the debates in envi-
ronmental ethics, where non-human natural environ-
ments receive a ‘pedagogical function’ also for social
interactions: How we treat other humans is trained by
interacting with the non-human environment—which
receives a somehow prototype status ([51], pp. 132–
135). In addition, a potentially related pedagogical func-
tion also applies to metaphors that transport this or the
following line of argumentation—with all its advan-
tages and disadvantages (see ‘What Is the Meta for?
Risks of Technomorphic Metaphors in Uncertain Situa-
tions’ and ‘From Radiation to Rehabilitation: the Posi-
tiveMethodological Functions ofMetaphors of Life and
Life as Metaphor’).
However, the fear could arise of certain dubious
effects on the (pedagogical) self-conception of humanity
if synthetic biology expands a technical-instrumental
handling to higher forms of life. This idea contains a
shift from the anthropological term of the homo faber,
who is ‘only’ manipulating existing organisms, to a
homo creator, who reinvents nature and is therefore at
risk of overestimating his comprehension of nature
([20]; see also [94]). It is also important to note here
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that the abovementioned self-conception of humanity is
different to the linguistic self-conception, including the
semantic side effect that has been mentioned with re-
spect to language-critical analysis of metaphorical
speech (see ‘Reveal a Scriptorium 4.0: Linguistic and
Biological Innovations of the ‘Genetic Code’ Meta-
phor’). But again, these objections are to be examined
for their part. Concerning negative implications and
(pedagogical) side effects of dealing with life as an
engineering and manufacturing matter, one has to dif-
ferentiate between two levels of argumentation: First,
the assumption that the purposeful designing and engi-
neering of living systems implies that these low life
forms are treated as mere non-living material; second,
the fear that this kind of objectifying handling leads to
negative and brutalising (pedagogical) side effects. The
first assumption seems to be only an assertion that lacks
the proof of its necessity. Merely because synthetic
biology follows the strong technical character of engi-
neering and production, it does not need to devaluate its
objects and treat them like non-living material. But even
if one might concede a certain tendency to such an
approach, one would have to show why this should be
a normative risk specific to synthetic biology, one that
does not already exist in the case of conventional bio-
technologies or genetic engineering—or even the mech-
anistic view of life since the seventeenth century (see
‘From Opposition to Amalgamation: Natural and Cul-
tural Life’). Similarly, the effect of brutalisation, of an
expansion of a devaluating and careless handling from
lower life forms to higher stages, seems to be more an
exaggerated fear than a probable and realistic conse-
quence. Why should the systematic design and fabrica-
tion and an instrumentalised usage of yeast cells and
bacteria lead to a problematic devaluation of higher life
forms or even have any consequences for the self-
understanding of man?
In the case of these lower forms of life, the common-
ality with plants, animals and particularly humans is
only comprehensible on an abstract level. We could
understand or accept that bacteria are part of the same
dimension—being alive—as we are, only if we ‘learn’
biological facts. There are no perceptible properties that
connect us with yeast cells—and not to forget the im-
portant language-critical separation between matter of
fact and ‘matter of ought’ (!). In this regard, ‘living
machines’ as an output of synthetic biology are in eth-
ical terms actually moremachines than living entities for
us. As mentioned in ‘Engineering Under an Umbrella:
Epistemology of Synthetic Biology and the Construc-
tive Approach’, Toepfer argues that synthetic biology
will primarily ‘broaden our concept of machines’ and
not promote our mechanistic view of life ([111], p. 82).
If this is true, we find again an example of ‘life’ as
Burstword II: the disciplinary and conceptual focus on
machines is extended due to the limits of a meaningful
application of the word ‘life’. This conclusion might
appear somehow surprising since a narrow view on life
as such is not expanded. What happens here can be seen
as a methodological—not ontological—treatment of the
Aristotelian nature-culture distinction. By adjusting the
terminological borderline, a semantic drawback of ‘life’
leads in this case to an expansion of ‘machine’—there
is, so to speak, a semantic undertow effect or, more
figuratively, an indirect backdoor bursting II. Even if
there are reasons to reject an ontological nature-culture
distinction as it is currently discussed (see (‘From Op-
position to Amalgamation: Natural and Cultural Life’),
another methodological advantage of this dualism has
been emphasised with respect to Janich [69]. The dual-
ism stands for the urgent methodological need for dif-
ferentiation between matter of fact (empirical-
descriptive talking about life or machines) and ‘matter
of ought’ (normative-reflexive talking about life or ma-
chines). Precise ethical assessment of synthetic biology
requires the explicit and clear conceptualisation of the
field, which also includes open eyes for the empirical
reality in the laboratory and its products. However, from
a morally relevant perspective, these objects are much
further away from higher organisms, so that it is abso-
lutely not convincing that a certain way of handling
bacteria in the petri dish would extend to our attitude
to mammals, for example. Not to mention, our own self-
understanding and self-evaluation. Most notably, it is
unclear why this of all things should occur here in the
case of synthetic biology, if it has not (already) hap-
pened after decades and centuries of factory farming and
industrial meat production.
As a critical appraisal of the outlined types of con-
ceptual criticism against synthetic biology shows, the
concept of life is a highly loaded and precarious notion
which indeed provokes controversial debate, but which
is thereby mainly misleading and irritating. Its remark-
able appeal and powerful ability to transport indistinct
fears and some incoherent apprehension are indicative
of another function of the usage of ‘life’ in the debate.
Criticism regarding synthetic biology’s concept of life
can be understood as the expression of a conceptual
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uncertainty and a corresponding uneasiness resulting
from the transgression and blurring of terminological
and ontological boundaries that seemed so far unalter-
able (life as Burstword I; see ‘From Buzz to Fuzz: the
Dangers of the Unclear and Metaphorical Use of
‘Life’’). These boundaries comprise the distinction be-
tween technology and nature, between products and
living beings, between natural and artificial, etc. There-
by, it must be emphasised that this uneasiness can po-
tentially have a big societal impact, because it does exist
(not only among ethicists and biocentrists). Moreover,
regarding its theoretical and conceptual impact, that
uneasiness should lead to questioning the conceptual
desire or demand for clear and definite distinctions and
boundaries—especially if one is dealing with thresholds
between nature and technology, as is to a considerable
degree the case with synthetic biology. Here we must
also clearly confess that the borderlines between life
as—in our terms—Buzzword I and Buzzword II are
blurry as well, since it depends heavily on the genuine
human cultural praxis of word use. ‘Life’ in synthetic
biology remains the object of ongoing challenges for
current rational critical debates including ethical assess-
ment and sceptical self-critique.
From Boost to Burst: Summary and Outlook
Our paper had various aims: We combined a review
of significant positions in the debates about life with
the aim to rethink its object: the use of ‘life’ in
synthetic biology. We thus created an account from
buzz to burst in six steps. The phenomenon of
bursting—which is our main thesis—can be applied
to the semantic, conceptual and disciplinary frame-
work in which the term ‘life’ is used. As with many
terms, the use of ‘life’ is not static. It can be used in
multiple ways, for instance in metaphorical speech or
as a buzzword for funding acquisition. In scientific
and also technoscientific contexts, the clarification of
key concepts is of certain relevance in order to enable
precise and successful communication and assess-
ment. To this extent, the bursting, transcending or
blurring of meaningful wording obviously contains
certain risks or even dangers. We introduced the term
Burstword I in order to illustrate the risky treatment
of terminology, which in a non-methodical way can
lead to something like an everything and nothing
situation—literally, the detonation of semantic
precision by creating fuzzy, foggy and buzzy clouds
of nonsense. This Burstword I diagnosis does not
only apply to ‘life’ in synthetic biology. In the end,
it is related to any kind of arbitrary treatment of
words, including unclear and misleading metaphors.
Here it should not be overlooked that Burstword (I
and II) is a metaphor itself, with all the typical pros
and cons of metaphorical speech.
What we call Burstword II is a functionality that can
be found in many scientific terms—it is not exclusively
reserved for ‘life’ in synthetic biology. We differentiated
between two ways of bursting with a primary focus on
the reconstruction of ‘life’ and its specific Burstword II
characteristic. A boosted examination of the term ‘life’
and its usage can lead to a better understanding of in
what sense it could fulfil its function of bursting
conceptualisations or disciplinary foci in a productive
sense—from boost to burst, so to speak. In conclusion,
to briefly summarise: ‘Life’ as Burstword II
1. is the opposite of Burstword I since it describes a
methodologically controlled use of ‘life’,
2. involves but is not limited to the innovative and
cognitive function of metaphors in the tradition of
Black, Kuhn and other authors,
3. is therefore itself a metaphor for this particular kind
of metaphorical speech (see also the Boydian ques-
tion ‘what is metaphor a metaphor for?’ [26],
4. includes following the demand that it is (as with
other metaphors) explicitly treated as metaphor…
5. …with the concrete function—besides innovation,
paradigm changes etc.—of widening the conceptu-
al and/or disciplinary foci, wherever the object/
problem requires this,
6. in conclusion, can be interpreted as a concept for
reflection or even as a transdisciplinary research
principle.
In order to demonstrate how this aspiration could be
realised from a philosophical point of view in both a
review-like and systematic manner,
1. the historical background has been reconstructed in
a language-critical way by revealing three concrete
conceptual characteristics of ‘life’, and with the aim
to systematically better understand the use of ‘life’
(in ‘Life Is Not Life: Aristotle’s Wide Concept of
Life and the Current Condensation of Modern
Thinking in Synthetic Biology’):
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A. the differences between and the clash of the
wide and narrow understandings,
B. the question of separation or amalgamation of
nature and culture,
C. its conceptual mechanisation since the seven-
teenth century in relation to the constructive,
engineering approach of synthetic biology
today,
2. aspects of their (1) impact on current debates and
somemain approaches of using ‘life’ between buzz-
word, folk, and theoretical concept have been illus-
trated (in ‘Life Is Not Life: Aristotle’s Wide Con-
cept of Life and the Current Condensation of Mod-
ern Thinking in Synthetic Biology’ and ‘From Buzz
to Fuzz: the Dangers of the Unclear and Metaphor-
ical Use of ‘Life’’),
3. the pros and cons of metaphorical speech and
technomorphic metaphors in the field have been
summarised, also with the incentive to illustrate
the word use we address with the distinction be-
tween Burstword I and Burstword II (in ‘From Buzz
to Fuzz: the Dangers of the Unclear and Metaphor-
ical Use of ‘Life’’ and ‘From Radiation to Rehabil-
itation: the Positive Methodological Functions of
Metaphors of Life and Life as Metaphor’).
4. trademarks of the research praxis and epistemic
characteristics of synthetic biology between theo-
retical science, engineering and technoscientific tin-
kering have been briefly reconstructed (in ‘From
Buzz to Boost: Naturalisation of Life and Its Meth-
odological Reduction in Synthetic Biology’ and
‘From Misguiding Simplification to Respectful
Complexity: an Argument Regarding the Ethical
Focus’),
5. three concrete examples have been included at the
end of the paper in order to make more clear how
‘life’ as Burstword II can motivate constructive
thinking out of the box since it
A. bursts a naturalised understanding of ‘informa-
tion’ in IT if metaphors like ‘genetic informa-
tion’ or ‘genetic code’ are reverse-reinterpreted
with regard to the wide meaning of ‘life’, in-
cluding the human way of life/conduct/behav-
iour of dialogical communication (including as
an example the language critique of Janich in
‘Reveal the Revolution: Methodologically
Controlled use of Metaphors as Metaphors’),
B. broadens the ethical focus to the manifold prax-
is of technoscientific tinkering and concrete
analyses of growing practical complexity in-
stead of limiting the assessment to a worldly
innocent fundamentalism (by discussing
Nordmann, Schwille and other authors in
‘FromMisguiding Simplification to Respectful
Complexity: an Argument Regarding the Ethi-
cal Focus’),
C. enables an argumentative rejection of side ef-
fects regarding the pedagogical self-conception
of humanity and instead leads to a reversed
expansion of the dialectically linked concept
of machine (with respect to the analysis of
Boldt , Toepfer and others in ‘From
(Proto)Type to Hype: an Argument for and
Against the Pedagogical Side Effect of ‘Living
Machines’’).
At the end of this paper, we want to emphasise the
tentative and open character of the systematic aim: the
attempt to think out of the box by dissecting and
reframing the debate under the umbrella of what we call
Burstword II. Since this idea is not yet fully
developed—a typical trademark of ongoing research—
we want to raise some open questions that we touched
on indirectly but could not answer in this paper. We
hope that our paper motivates further investigations in
this direction:
1. We tried to capture the three most important ones,
but have not been able to present an entire collec-
tion of all possibly related historical issues: What
else is significant for the concept of ‘life’ and its
methodical burst function?
2. What are the concrete ways in which the innova-
tive use of metaphors can be methodologically
controlled in detail? Only by explication or lan-
guage critique? Which role does for instance pro-
fessional training in research groups play? Is it a
growing necessity to bring philosophical language
critique into an R&D position? If yes, how could
or should this be realised?
3. Another follow-up question is the one about meth-
odology and epistemology of transdisciplinary re-
search where ‘life’ is seen as a common interest
despite disciplinary differences. Is the burst func-
tion a primary requirement in order to open up the
disciplinary expertise of each member and then to
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combine it in a real multidisciplinary synthesis
(which is more than parallel interdisciplinary work
with isolated methods)? If yes, are there examples
in other fields like economy or agile IT project
management that could help to better understand
the concrete implementation?
4. Does ‘life’ asBurstword II affect metaphorological
investigations and add another genuine transdis-
ciplinary perspective to the already discussed
functions of metaphors? If yes, how?
5. At several points, we referred to the self-concep-
tualisation of humanity, including the self-
understanding of researchers, as semantic and
pedagogical issue. These perspectives lead to ad-
dit ional questions: What kinds of self-
understandings relate to the use of ‘life’ in synthet-
ic biology? What are their characteristics and in
what way could they affect the use of ‘life’ as
Burstword II? What can we learn about the social
role of scientists?
6. The same is true for side effects as well. We pre-
sented an argument against the existence of a
certain form of pedagogical side effect, but this
does not mean that there are no side effects at all.
What are other side effects of the use of ‘life’ in
synthetic biology, how can they be classified and
what are the results of its further ethical
evaluation?
7. Within the narrative of this paper the umbrella
status of three concepts has been discussed: life,
synthetic biology and ‘life creation’ as an ethical
concept. Is Burstword II in the end one more
umbrella term or umbrella metaphor? Self-
critically asking: could another umbrella carry
any straightforward significance for the debate?
Can it be successfully applied as a tool to analyse
the concrete use of ‘life’ and/or support the me-
thodical explication of metaphors as metaphors?
8. In what sense could ‘life’ be a Burstword II in
other fields like robotics, artificial intelligence or
computer-based artificial life?
9. What are the results if other scientific or
technoscientific concepts like ‘information’ or
‘nature’ are critically analysed as Burstword II?
10. Do we find the concept of life as Burstword II also
in the political understanding of current societies?
Does this language-philosophical tool enable us to
revise and revaluate the popular concept of
biopolitics?
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